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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

vs.

:

JOHNL.LEGG,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 2004103 5-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, a second
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (West Supp. 2005), and arson,
a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-102 (1 )(b) (West 2004), in the
Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, the Honorable Randall Skanchy presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-3 (2)(e) (West
2004).'
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss
where defendant's 120-day disposition request was prematurely filed?

1

Because no changes to code sections relevant to the issues in this case have been
made since the time the offenses were committed, the State cites to the latest edition of
me code.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"[The appellate court] review[s] a trial court's determination that a defendant's
charges should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute for abuse of discretion."
Statev. Coleman,2001 UT App 281,^3,34 P J d 790, cerf. denied, 42P3d951 (Utah2002).
"An appellate court will find abuse of discretion only where there is no 'reasonable basis in
the record to support' the trial court's Speedy Trial Statute determination of 'good cause.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
2. Did the trial court violate defendant's right to allocution, to counsel, and to
presentation of all material information at his sentencing?
The State confesses error as to the first claim, necessitating a remand for resentencing.
STATUTES AND RULE
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A:
§§ 77-29-1 - 2 (West 2004);
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22.

UTAH CODE ANN.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
120-day disposition
On November 30,2003, defendant was arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle and
arson. Rl. On December 9, 2003, defendant signed a "Notice and Request for Disposition
of Pending charges" (120-day disposition request), which referred to "arson and auto theft"
charges, assertedly pending against him in Tooele County. R7. The 120-day notice was
stamped, "received," on January 5, 2004. Id.

The notice also bore a hand-written

certification that indicated that the 120-day notice had been received on January 8,2004. Id.

2
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The same day, the authorized agent who certified receipt of the 120-day disposition request
mailed it to the Tooele County Attorney's Office. R6. Six days later, on January 14,2004,
an information charging defendant with theft by receiving stolen property (Count I) and arson
(Count II) was filed in the Third District Court, Tooele County. R3-2.
On March 8, a two-day trial was set for May 19 and May 20. R28. On April 26,
however, that setting was vacated and the trial set to May 6, based on defendant's asserted
conflict with his counsel, Scott Broadhead, and to ensure that defendant was tried within the
120-day period (R28-26, 42-41; 271:40-41);
On May 4,2004, defendant, represented by counsel, moved to dismiss the information
with prejudice because defendant had not been tried within 120 days of either December 9,
2003 or January 5, 2004. R52-50. Two days later, on May 6, the trial court heard
defendant's motion and denied it. R54, 271:26-37. The trial court found that January 8,
2004 marked the beginning of the 120-day period. R271:35. Based on that date, the court
concluded that the 120-day period expired on May 10. Id. The court then granted
defendant's stipulated request to set trial for May 25, and his request to engage a defense
expert to review the State's arson expert's report. R36-29, 54; 271:36-37.
On May 24, the May 25 trial setting was vacated and a scheduling hearing set for June
6, 2004, at which time this Court denied defendant's request for an interlocutory appeal.
R56. The district court set trial for July 20. R58.
On July 19, the trial court granted Mr. Broadhead's request to withdraw, appointed
Wayne Freestone as substitute counsel, struck the July 20 trial setting, and set defendant's
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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new motion to dismiss for hearing at a new pretrial conference. R70-68.
On August 16, the trial court granted Mr. Freestone's request to withdraw. It then
appointed L. Douglas Hogan as standby counsel, with which defendant agreed. R93-92;
271:38-39.
On August 23, defendant, pro se, with Mr. Hogan acting as standby counsel, renewed
his motion to dismiss, arguing that the Department of Institutional Operations had improperly
retained his 120-day notice for 30 days—December 9 to January 8—before processing it, and
that the 120-day period had expired. Rl 03-100; 271:47,49-53. The prosecutor noted that the
State would have tried defendant within the 120-day period on May 6, but for defendant's
repeated requests for continuances—first to locate an expert to counter the State's arson
expert, then for defendant to prepare after firing his attorneys, and finally because defendant
suffered physical injuries in a prison altercation. R62; 271:54-55. The trial court again
denied defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the 120-day disposition period began
to run from the date the information was filed—January 12, 2004—and expired 120 days
later—May 29. R271:58.
Trial was held November 3. Defendant represented himself with standby counsel
from approximately June 30 through November 3. During that period, defendant sought
repeated hearings or continuances for a variety of reasons: conflicts with his various counsel
(R66, 74-71, 83-81, 90-89, 93-92, 107-104, 137-136, 143-142; 271:60, 63-71); challenges
to denials of his repeated motions to dismiss based on the expiration of the 120-day
disposition period (R70-68, 93, 103-100, 112-109; 271:40-41, 49-53); injuries incurred in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a prison assault (R62); petition for interlocutory appeal (R67, 865 93, 271:41-42); challenge
to jurisdiction (R74-71; 271:58-60); request to proceed pro se (R88; 271:60); requests for
transcripts and discovery (R95-93; 115-114; 271:45); and preparation for trial (R151-149,
153).2
Trial and judgment
At trial, defendant continued to represent himself, with Mr. Jon D. Williams acting
as standby counsel. R143-142; 269:1-262; 271:63-71. A jury convicted defendant on both
charges. R189.
Sentencing
Defendant also represented himself at his sentencing on January 24, 2005, with Mr.
Williams again acting as standby counsel. R223-222; 271:287. The trial court began by
asking defendant if there was anything in the presentence investigation report (PSI) that
needed to be addressed before sentencing. R271:76. Defendant asserted that the PSI
contained inaccuracies as to his criminal and social history, mitigating circumstances, and
victim the impact statement. R271:76-78. When defendant engaged in a meandering attack
on the Utah sentencing scheme, the trial court cut defendant off and again asked defendant
to specifically identify the inaccuracies in the PSI. R271:79. For the remainder of his
colloquy with the court, defendant was only able to state that the PSI mistakenly attributed
40 arrests to him and placed his 1987 business burglary in West Valley instead of Salt Lake

2

The substance and chronology of the entire proceedings is set out at Appendix B.

3

The facts of the offenses are unnecessary to the disposition of the case. *
5
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City. R271:79-84. Frustrated with his inability to articulate himself, defendant had the
following colloquy with the court:
Defendant: You won't let me even conduct myself as an attorney.
The Court: Well, you're not an attorney and I've already advised you that
you'd be foolish to represent yourself, but you've gone ahead
and chosen to do that anyway.
Defendant: Okay, then why don't you appoint counsel and we'll get all
this straightened out?
The Court: Because you've chosen to go the other route.
Defendant: Make up your mind.
The Court: Make up my mind? Okay. I sentence you on these charges to
theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, *
1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. On arson, zero to five
years at the Utah State Prison. I'll run them consecutive to
each other. I'll do so based upon the aggravating circumstances
that your adult record is [legion] and as a result of its being [legion]—
Defendant: There ain't even a victim. Where's your victim.
The Court: We're done now because sentencing is over. Please take him
to the Utah State Prison.
R271:84-85.4
The signed minutes of the sentencing hearing and the sentencing order reflect that
defendant was sentenced to a statutory one-to-fifteen-year term on his conviction for theft
by receiving stolen property and to a statutory zero-to-five-year term on his conviction for
arson.

R225-222; 271:85. They also show that the sentences were ordered to run

4

The transcript of the sentencing is attached at Addendum C.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6

consecutively to one another and to the sentence that defendant was currently serving. R225222.
Consolidation of appellate cases
On November 22, 2004, after the jury rendered its verdict, but before the court
sentenced him on January 24,2005, defendant filed a "Notice for a New Trial." R199. On
November 26, the trial court denied the motion as untimely. R203. Defendant filed a notice
of appeal on November 28, 2004 from the "final judgment and verdict," and this Court
assigned an official case number to the appeal—No. 2004103 5-CA. R209-208. After he was
sentenced, defendant filed another notice of appeal on February 2,2005, now appealing from
the "order, judgment, and commitment entered on January 24." R230. The Court assigned
another official case number to the appeal—No. 20050114-CA.

R231. The Court

consolidated both cases under the initial case number. R239.
Defendant requested appointment of appellate counsel, and following remand by this
Court, the trial court appointed defendant's current counsel. R255-254.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court properly denied defendant's repeated motions to dismiss the case based
on the prosecutor's alleged failure to try his case within the time period specified under
Utah's speedy trial statute. Defendant delivered his 120-day disposition request to prison
authorities before the information was filed. Consequently, defendant's premature request
was a legal nullity, having no effect on triggering the 120-day disposition period.

7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Defendant's arguments that due process requires that his disposition request be held to have
"kicked in" on the date the information was filed are unpreserved, unsupported by the record,
and without merit.
POINT II
The State confesses harmful error in that the trial court sentenced defendant before
it afforded him the opportunity for allocution. The State neither concedes nor resists
defendant's claim that the prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present information
material to the imposition of sentence or that the trial court violated his rights by refusing to
grant defendant's request for counsel at sentencing. The State suggests, however, that since
the case must be remanded for the trial court to resentence defendant, the prudent course
would be for this Court to direct that counsel for defendant be appointed for sentencing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S PREMATURE FILING RENDERED HIS 120-DAY
DISPOSITION REQUEST A NULLITY, AND HIS ARGUMENTS
THAT IT SHOULD AUTOMATICALLY "KICK IN" AT THE FILING
OF THE INFORMATION ARE UNPRESERVED AND MERITLESS
Defendant claims that "the trial court abused its discretion in finding that good cause
existed not to dismiss the charges against [him] because [he was not tried] within 120 days
after receiving notice of [his] written demand as required under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-291." Aplt. Br. at 24.5 Recognizing for the first time on appeal that his 120-day notice was filed
5

Defendant also claims that his rights were similarly violated under the United
States and Utah constitutions. Aplt. Br. at 24. He does not, however, apply any federal
or state constitutional analysis to his claim. Therefore, the State declines to address
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
8
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prematurely; anr •.. .^ ^;u- a nullity, defendant argues that his request should nevertheless
have ukick[edj in *\\wn me information was ultimately filed because prison authorities

77-29-2 (West 2004). Aplt. Br. at 24-29. The Court should not consider the argument
because it was never raised in the trial court, and defendant has not argued plain error or
exceptional circumstances on appeal. In any event, there is no record evidence that prison
iiulhui'ilies breached am dut) under section 77-24-*!.

.'

/.

.•

A. Defendant filed a premature 120-day disposition i c quest.
Defendant signed his 120-day disposition request on December 9, 2003? referring to
his arrest for "arson and auto theft/' charges assertedly pending in Tooele County. R7. The
. ' dispositioi I i eqi lest w as stamped ,6recei\ ed" on January 5, 2004, bi it It also bore a
hand-written certification that indicated that it had been rece i\ sdon January 8,200 4 h i Six
days later, on January 14, an information charging defendant with theft by receiving stolen
property and arson was filed in the Third District Court, Tooele County. R3-2.
A prematurely-filed 120-day disposition request is a legal nullity.
Utah's wtspiYth tiiiiT NIUIIIIIC (,tKu known ,r< (he 'Mrl.iiniT" skitntc) pur, ides Ih n
"[w]henever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in a state prison . . . and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried. . information, and the prisoner shall
ddh ' erto

theci istodial officer in authority, a written demai id specifying the nature of the

defendant's constitutional claims. See State v. Brandley, 911 r._u s. ;> i u J (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (refusing to address claim that counsel's ineffective assistance violated rights
under article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution where "no independent authority or
argument" was provided).
9
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charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge,
he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the delivery of the
written notice." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1(1) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
"Deciding whether the district court properly denied [the defendant's] motion to
dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute requires a two-step inquiry." State v. Heaton, 958
P.2d911, 916 (Utah 1998). "First, we must determine when the 120-day period commenced
and when it expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-day period, we must then
determine whether 'good cause5 excused the delay." Id.
In State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, 18 P.3d 504, this Court held that the second
step of the foregoing inquiry was obviated by the facts of that case. Id, at \ 9. There, this
Court held that the delivery of a 120-day disposition request to the custodial authority before
the filing of the information was a nullity in triggering the 120-day disposition period. Id.
at f 14. The Court noted that the plain language of the statute required that "formal charges
must be pending against [the defendant] when the request is delivered." Id, at f 10. The
Court observed that "[a]n action cannot be pending when it is yet to be commenced." Id, at
f 12 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 5 (a)). Rule 5, Utah Rules of Criminal procedure states, "all
criminal prosecutions . . . shall be commenced by the filing of an information . . . ." The
Utah Supreme Court has explained that "a written signed accusation does not become an
information until filed with the clerk of the court." State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, ^ 12,
65 P.3d 1180 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-3(3) (1999)) (emphasis added). Because
Lindsay delivered his 120-day disposition request before the information was filed, his

10
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request was premature, a legal nullity, and therefore "[did not] trigger[] the statutory right
to demand trial on any i mtried

information." Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379. If 14 (quoting

Stan " i \ Wright. ' 7 1 5 I \2< 14 1 7 150 51 ( [ ) h ih 198'/ )) (bn ickets added), Consequently, this
Court upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss h / at % 16 See
Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2,ffi[1243 (same).
As in Lindsay and Leatherbury, because defendant's 120-day disposition request was
fk* .-.*. ,u;a: • . .d thus was of no el feet. ' I his Court shouiu merefore uphold the trial
t i

d/ni.r -

• 'cmianf s inolion In duniss

Mllion -h Ihi" tmil uuirl did mil dnn ilie

motion based on defendant's premature filing of his disposition request, "[i]t is well settled
that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from c'~ "\ '^ ^stainable on any
legal ground oi theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory diners
fl"

* '

^*.«:

'

*

'

I

" 111",

Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, \ 9, 7o I\3d 115KJ ^citation& omuicdj.
Here, like the defendants in Lindsay and Leatherbury, defendant filed a premature
120-day disposition request.

IMe i-ui . ^ m

•

nA 4

hat defendant filed his 120-day

dispusilion requesf on human S ^Oll-I U V71 •"}*> Ddmdiinl docsnol challenge that finding,
Aplt. Br. at 32. The information was filed on January 14, 2004. R271:58. Thus, the triiil
court's undisputed findings show that defendant's request was prematurely filed before the
information was filed. Based on ihov; h icL"- .* >•- :'.e foregoing discussion, defendant's
pren lature reqi lesl was a leg; il ni illity i t.;i:id. tl le trii i 1 coi u t property dei lied his motion to
dismiss.

11
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C. Defendant's due process claim that his premature filing "kicked in" when
the information was filed is unpreserved, unsupported by any exception to
the preservation rule or the record, and substantively without merit.
1. Defendant failed to preserve his argument in the trial court and
does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal
In Lindsay, this Court stated: "[A] premature request for disposition does not later
'kick in" once the information is ultimately filed . . . . A premature request is simply a
nullity, having no legal effect." Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, \ 14. See also Leatherbury,
2003 UT 2, f 12. For the first time on appeal, defendant recognizes Lindsay and Leather bury
and that his request was filed prematurely. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. He nevertheless argues that
due process demands that his disposition request should be held to have "kicked in" on the
day the information was filed, primarily because the prison authorities breached their duty
to inform him when the information had actually been filed as required by UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-29-2 (West 2004). Aplt. Br. at 27. The Court should decline to consider this argument
because defendant did not preserve it in the trial court and defendant does not argue plain
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal.
"'Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order
to preserve an issue for appeal.'" State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 14, 543 Utah Adv. Rep. 31
(quoting State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45, 114 P.3d 551) (additional citations omitted).
'" When a party raises an issue on appeal without having properly preserved the issue below,
' [this Court will] require that the party articulate an appropriate justification for appellate
re. iew,... specifically, the party must argue either plain error or exceptional circumstance.'"
Td (quoting Finder, 2005 UT 15, ^ 45) (additional quotations and citations omitted).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Defendant did not raise his due process claim below. Indeed, he did not even acknowledge
that ; - i~w-u.i.

disposition request was premature and therefore j \ _ *

Consequently , his due process claim is \ inpreser v ed

.r'i\

See Id.

"[I]n general, appellate courts will not considei an issi ie, inch iding constiti itic nail
arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or
the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 13,95 P.3d 276
(citing State v. •
an unpreserved

IJU\ _• • '

.
'

•

—'- •

* • • *.;;i ier. a party seeking review of
•

!

*rl\ . npunuy

brief" Finder, 2005 UT i:, '„ ^ (citing Coleman v. Si^vui^ 2U00 Uf 9$, % 9, 17 P.3d
1122). When a party fails to do so, an appellate c<mr

il« refuse to consider the unpreserved

issue Id. at <[fl} 50', 58 (refusing to considc; nnder's unpreserved claims because he "failed
to at gue plain • srr :)i: or show exceptional circi n nstances oi l appeal"). 4ccoi i / State " i
Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272 -73 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (alleged due process viol.r ^ statutory term claimed to be insufficiently specific); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473-474
(I Jtal I Ct ' Vpp.

1991) ("[Unpreserved] Shondel claim presents neither 'plain error' nor

'exceptioi lal circi in istances' ai id, therefore, w e refi lse to coi isidei it foi the first time on
appeal")
Defendant here does not argue that "plain error" or "exceptional circumstance" should
x.

i : ;.n IIK to preserve his due process claim. 1 his Court should therefore decline to

cunsi, ." ' v. (- " :. ; . 2005 i I'l I V"|| b
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2. Defendant fails to support his section 77-29-2 claim with an adequate record.
This Court should also decline to consider defendant's claim because he has not
provided any record to support his primary contention—prison authorities breached their
statutory duty to inform him of the filing of the information.
Section 77-29-2 provides:
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or informations
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that prisoner's
right to make a request for final disposition thereof.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-29-2 (West 2004) (emphasis added).

Defendant argues that his premature disposition notice should be held to have "kicked
in" when the information was filed on January 14,2004 because prison authorities failed to
inform him when the information was filed, as required under section 77-29-2. Aplt. Br. at
27-28.
This Court should not consider this claim because defendant has not provided this
Court with an adequate record to review it. Specifically, there is no record evidence that the
authorities ever knew that the information had been filed on January 14. See State v. Careno,
2005 UT App 208, \ 19,113 P.3d 1004 (declining to consider claim unsupported by adequate
record); State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988) ("Inasmuch as defendant has
failed to provide an adequate record on appeal on this point, this [c]ourt presumes regularity
in the proceedings below.")
Alternatively, and contrary to defendant's contention, the record evidence suggests
that the prison authorities fulfilled their duties under the statute. Defendant acknowledged
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that the authorities fulfilled their initial duty to inform him of his right to a final disposition
of any untried information when, as he admitted, the prison authorities gave him a packet
wlm In tiu hided ilie I .!li-da\ disposition ivquesl as sin m as lie entered I lie prison on December
3,2003. R271:26. As to prison authorities" second dul ' dt/fnidant ivpeafedh asserts dial
they did not inform him of the filing of the information on January 14. Aplt. Br. at 28. Ihe
statute, however, requires that they inform a defendant only of any untried informations of
w hichthe} haveknc w ledge I her e is no record evidence t..i; u^ authorities ever knew that
the information had been filed <ai lannaiY ! 1 Indeed, ihen is nmrcnnl e\ ident.e In suppml
that the authorities did not inform defendant that the information had been filed. In short,
defendant's claim fails for lack of record evidence.
Jefendunt has failed to show that his due process arguments have merit
m spile oi the iuregoinp. fundamental defects in his .iimnnenl, defendant nes cilia, lass
argues that the trial court, the prosecutor, and his attorneys apparently accepted that his
premature 120-day notice "kicked in" on the date the information was filed. Therefore, he
claims that he, legally in iti itored, must be given in, ;-.;u. • : ••; Uie same misunderstanding.
Aplt. Br. at 28-29. In effect, defendant anaues dial I In • Stale should he estopped fi'oin arguing
that his claim fails because he filed his request prematurely: "The State cannot come back
and state Mr. Legg's request for a 120-day disposition is 4null and void5 when the prison did
-

*•

.-r-

That argument mi

-

*•

'

*>

\ -> L

•• -

-- *--

Aplt

« •.

s

officials did not follow the statutory requirements. Second, although the pmsei
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;. >

the burden of showing that it has complied with the 120-day disposition requirement of
section 77-29-1, that burden only arises after a defendant properly requests the 120-day
disposition. See Wright, 745 P.2d at 450-51 (the disposition request must be properly
delivered to proper authorities and contain an appropriate demand to be effective); State v.
Viles, 702 P.2d 1175,1176 (Utah 1985) ("Section 77-29-1 places the burden on the prisoner
to give notice to the warden."); Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, f 7, 18 P.3d 504 ^After a
prisoner appropriately requests speedy resolution of pending charges, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to commence trial within the 120-day period set out in the statute.") (emphasis
added). Third, defendant cites no legal authority to support his claim that due process
requires relief under these facts. Thus, defendant was not relieved of his burden to timely
file a 120-day disposition request merely because the trial court later, albeit incorrectly, fixed
the commencement of the 120-day disposition period on the date the information was signed.
Furthermore, defendant did not bring the matter to the court's attention until May 4,
three days before the 120-day period was to expire. R52-50. The trial court had already
moved the trial date back from May 19 to May 6, to accommodate defendant's alleged wish
to be tried within 120 days from January 8, the day on which he prematurely delivered his
disposition request. R28-26, 42-41; 271:40-41. The prosecutor was ready to try defendant
on May 6, the day before the 120-day period would have expired even if it did run from
January 8. But il was defendant who was not ready to proceed (R62; 271:53-55).6 Thus, it

6

At the May 6 hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, the court granted
defendant's stipulated request to set trial for May 25, to have a defense expert review the
State's arson expert's report (R54; 271:36-37).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is defendant who should be estopped from taking advantage of the trial court's later error in
fixing the commencement of the 120-period at January 12.
Defendant ci it sorll) argues that other aspects of his case require a reversal i mdei • ii le
process ^pjt gr

at

29-31. None of these other arguments have merit. Defendant argues

that Mr. Freestone and Mr. Angerhoffer, prison contract attorneys whom he met with on
December 15, 2003, told him that they could not provide any services concerning his 120-day
reqi lest

« Ipli. Br at 29 (citii lg R 103).

Defendai it presents no i ecord e\ idence of this

Indeed, the information had not even been filed then. Therefore, defendant has shown no
duty on the part of these attorneys.
..». i c\\ J ant impliedly argues that because .u,
-v,-f- , ,i '-'(rn.danfs dispos

-;

^

\ ^ MM; , ,\;^nk\ . • MIILC ,AC
*•

'

provided b> section 77-29-i. Apii. iii. at 29-30 siting R27i.jjj. ilowever, Wright,
Lindsay, and Leatherbury implicitly teach that a prosecutor has no duty to inform defendant
that his notice is premature. The prosecutor only has a duty to bring defendant to trial within
120 :Ia:> s of a th i: iel> filed 120 da> i lotice, and as extended foi "good cai lse" dela> s
attributable to defendant. Moreover, even if defendant's arguments under section 77-29-2
had been preserved, it would not serve him here because the duty imposed by that section is
on the custom.a. \\\cc:^ noi i;,e prosecutor. See I J I 'AH C O D E A N N. § 7' 7-29-2 ( Vv est 2004).
Defendant i ixgi les tha t < idji idication of the chz irges in this c -ase within tl le • 1 20 :k i ; y
period was made more imperative because a parole hearing, apparently stemming \^w\
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another conviction, would be put on hold until the disposition of the instant charges. Aplt.
Br. at 30 (citing R103). However, the basis of defendant's assertion is again his own selfserving, unnotarized statement, which does not even mention that a parole board hearing was
set. R103. Further, defendant cites no legal authority in support of this claim. But more
important, as stated, the prosecution had no duty to bring defendant to trial within 120 days
because his disposition request was premature and thus a legal nullity. See Lindsay, 2000 UT
App 379, % 14, and Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, ^ 12.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor unduly delayed filing the information. Aplt. Br.
at 30 (citing Rl 12-111). He argues that although the fire marshal's report was dated
December 10,2003 and faxed to the Tooele County Attorney's Office on December 12, the
prosecutor "sat on" the report until he filed the information on January 14,2004. Id. (citing
Rl 12-111, 32). This argument fails for lack of record support. Two copies of the fire
marshal's report, dated December 10,2003, appear in the record. R34-32,124-122. Neither
copy nor any record the State has located, other than defendant's self-serving, unnotarized
statement, indicates that the report was faxed to the Tooele County Attorney's Office on
December 12. Rl 12-111, 34-32, 124-122. But again, Lindsay, expressly rejected this
argument because the "purpose of the statute is to promote speedy trials, not the speedy filing
of informations." Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, ^ 15.
In sum, defendant's premature filing of his 120-day disposition request obviated any
duty the prosecutor had to bring defendant to trial within the time period specified by section

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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77-29-1.
POIN1 II
THE STA'I E COINCEDES "liiAl
inE
IKIAL
COURT'S
SENTENCING ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED—THE TRIAL
DISREGARDED ITS AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO AFFORD
DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ALLOCUTION; THE CASE
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
Defendant claims that the trial coi trt violated his due process rigni:. a , .• *
HI indei i ule 22(a), [ Jtali R iiles of Cri i ninal Procedi ire \\ li m. 1 le w as sentenced 1 v ithoi it an
opportunity for allocution, see Aplt. Br. at Pt. Ill (23), or for the prosecutor to present
information material to the imposition of his sentence.8 See Aplt. Br. at Pt. II (19-13). I le
also claims that the trial court violated his right to counsci w hen it sentenced him without
c< )i msel

1} >lt. Br at I ' it 1 ( 1 3 IS •)

'

•

\

' '

-

'

Despite this conclusion, defendant nevertheless repeats his argument that the
liu-day period did "kick in" on January 14, 2004, the date the information was filed,
because the trial court found at the August 23 hearing that that was the date the 120-day
period began. Aplt. Br. at 31 -33. Defendant here specifically argues that because the
trial court miscalculated the 120-day period, beginning on January 14, 2004, to have
ended on May 29, the court failed to make the "good cause" findings required to show
that trial beyond 120 days was attributable to him. Aplt. Br. at 34-35. As argued above,
because defendant's prematurely filed disposition request was a legal nullity, any failure
of the trial court in later miscalculating the expiration of the 120-day disposition period or
to make adequate "good cause" findings is irrelevant to the resolution of defendant's
claim.
8

Defendant claims violations of his due process rights under both the United
States and Utah constitutions and rule 22(a) to support Points II and III. Aplt. Br. at 19,
23. However, because "[n]o argument has been made as to why . , . under the Utah
[Rules of Criminal Procedure], the result would be different under wither the Utah or the
federal constitution, we will therefore treat the contention as a single argument rather than
as three separate arguments." State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 11 n.2, 31 P.3d 615
(citation omitted), affd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937.
19
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Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation
of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).
"A defendant's personal exercise of the rights granted in rule 22(a) is referred to as
allocution." State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, | 29, 31 P.3d 615 (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original), affd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. "Rule 22(a) codifies the commonlaw right of allocution, allowing a defendant to make a statement in mitigation or explanation
after conviction but before sentencing." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, % 18 (citation omitted). The
State concedes that the trial court did not allow defendant to personally exercise his right to
allocution.9 Under Wanosik, this was reversible error. See Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, f 18. The
case should therefore be remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which defendant may
allocute.
Because the State agrees that defendant should be given a new sentencing hearing on
the allocution claim, this Court need not address defendant's other claims. However, because
the case should be remanded for resentencing, any error in failing to grant defendant's

9

Notwithstanding its concession, the State recognizes that the trial court's action
was understandably provoked. At sentencing, defendant generally insisted on directing
the proceeding as he thought appropriate, rather than responding to the court's reasonable
and explicit instructions. R271:76-85. At one point, defendant simply disregarded the
court's refusal to hear defendant's unrelated legal arguments, said, "Oh, shit," and carried
on as before. R271:79. Defendant's request for counsel was downright impertinent and
offensive. R271:84-85. Nevertheless, the affirmative requirement to afford a defendant
an opportunity to allocute is clear. See Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^f 18.
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request for counsel can be readily cured on remand. Indeed, it would be appropriate for this
Court to direct the trial court to appoint counsel if itfindsthat defendant is indigent. The
State assumes that defendant would not now oppose such appointment given his request at
sentencing and his claim of error on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_

day of March, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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AHHenHiim A

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-29-1 (West 2004)

§ 77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge-Duties of custodial
officer-Continuance may be granted-Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to trial
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or other penal or
correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried
indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer
in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the
charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall
be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written
notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand described in Subsection (1),
shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return
receipt requested, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney with
such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be
requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the
defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being
present, may be granted any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such continuance as has
been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the
proceeding. If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance
was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.

Laws 1980, c. 15, §2.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-29-2 (West 2004)

§ 77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of untried indictments or informations
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in writing of the source and
contents of any untried indictments or informations against that prisoner concerning which he has
knowledge and of that prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof.
Laws 1980, c. 15, §2.
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22
RULE 22. SENTENCE, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea,
unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement
and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may
likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant
for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall
enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence.
Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it
with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender
committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. §
77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order.
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Addendum R

Chronology of proceedings in prosecution of defendant John L. Legg:
November 30, 2003 - defendant was arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle and
arson (Rl).
December 9 - defendant signed a "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending
charges" (120-day disposition request), which referred to "arson and auto theft" charges
pending against him in Tooele County, brought by "the Utah Highway Patrol" (R7);
January 5, 2004 - the 120-day notice was stamped, "received" (R7);
January 8 - the authorized agent who certified receipt of the 120-day notice mailed it
to the Tooele County Attorney's Office (R.6).
January 14 - an information charging defendant with theft by receiving stolen property
(Count I) and arson (Count II) was docketed (R3-2);
March 8 - a two-day trial is set for May 19 and May 20 (R28);
April 26 - based on defendant's asserted conflict with Mr. Broadhead, trial, formerly
set for May 19, was moved forward to May 6 to ensure that defendant was tried within the
120-day period (R28-26, 42-41; 271:39-41);
May 4 - defendant, represented by Scott A. Broadhead, moved to dismiss the
information with prejudice because defendant had not been tried withing 120 days from
either December 9, 2003 or January 5, 2004 (R52-50);
May 6 - the trial court heard defendant's motion to dismiss and denied it (R54,
271:26-37); the trial court found that January 8, 2004 marked the beginning of the 120-day
period because that was the date that was "officially noted as being sworn to by the officer"
at the Division of Institutional Operations (R271:35); based on that date, the court concluded
that the 120-day period expired on May 10, 2004 (id.); the court also found good cause to
extend the 120-day period because defendant repeatedly had not objected to the setting of
trial dates outside the 120-day period (R271:33-36); the court then granted defendant's
stipulated request to set trial for May 25, to have a defense expert review the State's arson
expert's report, which the prosecutor had sent to defense counsel on April 8 (R36-29, 54;
271:36-37);
May 24 - the May 25 trial setting was vacated and a scheduling hearing was set for
June 6, 2004 (R56);
June 6 - the trial court denied defendant's request for an interlocutory appeal, and trial
was set for July 20 (R58);
June 30 - defendant informed the court that he had been hospitalized for injuries
suffered in a recent prison assault and requested an extension until mid-August to prepare
his defense (R62);
July 8 - defendant filed a motion in which he claimed that his counsel, Mr. Broadhead,
had consented to continuances without defendant's consent and in which defendant requested
that the trial court appoint new counsel (R66);
July 15 - defendant notified the clerk of the district court to reschedule the trial, set
for July 19 [sic] because he had filed a petition for interlocutory review in the court of
appeals on July 12 (R67, 86); this Court returned the petition to defendant because the
petition was not addressed properly (R86); this Court denied defendant's refiled petition
because it was untimely
(R86);
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On July 19 - defendant filed a motion to dismiss in which he alleged not only the
prosecutor's failure to timely bring him to trial under Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1, but also that
Mr. Broadhead had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file defendant's
motions and that the court lacked jurisdiction of the theft-by-receiving charge because the
incident occurred in Salt Lake County (R74-71); the trial court granted Mr. Broadhead's
request to withdraw, appointed substitute counsel, Wayne Freestone, struck the July 20 trial
setting, and set defendant's motion to dismiss for hearing at a new pretrial conference on
August 2 (R70-68);
July 22 - defendant filed a motion for "statu[t]es review" in which he claimed that his
newly appointed attorney, Wayne Freestone, had a conflict of interest with him and in which
he requested the trial court not appoint Mr. Freestone as his counsel (R83-81);
July 28 - defendant, without reference to a specific purpose or date, moved to extend
the proceedings to allow him to proceed pro se in the preparation of his defense until new
counsel could be appointed (R88-85);
August 2 - because of a scheduling conflict, Mr. Freestone did not appear for the
hearing; defendant, pro se, argued that Mr. Freestone had a conflict; the trial court continued
the hearing to August 16, at which time the court would hear defendant's pro se motions
(R90-89);
August 16 - the trial court granted Mr. Freestone's request to withdraw and appointed
L. Douglas Hogan as standby counsel, with which defendant agreed (R93-92; 271:38-39);
defendant argued his own motion for extension of time for filing his petition for interlocutory
appeal (R93; 271:41-42)10; defendant, pro se, also again moved to dismiss the case based on
the expiration of the 120-day disposition period (R93; 271:40-41); the court had not reviewed
the motion, believing that it had already reviewed it on May 6, and continued that matter to
August 23 (R271:45-46); defendant also filed a motion for transcripts in contemplation of
proceeding pro se at trial (R95-93; 271:45);
August 23 - defendant again represented himself; Mr. Hogan acted as standby counsel
(R271:47); defendant again argued that the Department of Institutional Operations had
improperly retained his 120-day notice for 30 days—December 9 to January 8—before
processing it, and that the 120-day period had expired (R103-100; 271:49-53); the prosecutor
noted that the State would have tried defendant within the 120-day period on May 6, but for
defendant's repeated requests for continuances—first to locate an expert to counter the
State's arson expert, then for defendant to prepare after firing his attorneys, and finally
because defendant suffered physical injuries in aprison altercation (R62; 271:53-55); the trial
court again denied defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the 120-day disposition
period began to run from the date the information was filed—January 12,2004—and expired
120 days later—May 29 (R271:58); the court found that "extension has been granted as a
result of requests by counsel and they're reasonable" (id)\ the court also denied defendant's
10

Defendant was mistakenly before the trial court on August 16 on his pro se
motion to extend the time for filing his pro se petition for interlocutory appeal, which the
court of appeals had apparently denied as untimely. R271:41-42, 53. The trial court
explained to defendant that it lacked the power to rule on a matter that lay entirely within
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pro se motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction, finding that the theft-by-receiving incident
occurred in Tooele County (R271:58-60); the trial court then sought to set the case for trial
(R271:60); Mr. Hogan stated that he was ready to proceed immediately, but that defendant
wanted to represent himself (id.); defendant stated that Mr. Hogan had a conflict because he
was representing "the victim of one of my crimes, an assault on an inmate within this Tooele
County Jail" (id.); the trial court stated that it would not hear defendant's oral motion to
disqualify his counsel because it was not then properly before the court (id.); defendant
agreed to file a written motion (id.); the court set trial for October 26 (R271:61); the court
set September 20 to hear any motions, directing defendant to file his prospective motion to
disqualify his counsel as soon as possible and indicating that standby counsel needed to be
located to help represent defendant at trial, all of which defendant also agreed with (id.);
August 26 - the trial court granted Mr. Hogan5s motion to withdraw (R107-104);
September 1 - defendant moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the prosecutor
had misrepresented that the filing of the information had been delayed by the extended time
necessary for the fire marshal to prepare his report and for the prosecutor to review it (Rl 12109);
September 5 - defendant moved for a bill of particulars, alleging that Mr. Hogan had
ineffectively failed to request one to prepare a defense (Rl 15-114);
September 30 - the prosecutor prepared and filed a lengthy and detailed bill of
particulars, with exhibits, which he hand-delivered to defendant two working days later
(R135-116);
October 4 (pretrial conference) - possible conflicts counsel—Mrss. Broadhead,
Freestone, and Hogan all have conflicts with defendant; trial court appoints Jon Williams as
conflicts counsel and continues matter until October 18 for another pretrial conference; court
denied defendant's renewed motion to dismiss of August 28 (R137-136);
October 18 - Mr. Williams entered his appearance as defendant's standby counsel,
with whose appointment defendant agreed; following Frampton colloquy, the court allowed
defendant to represent himself; defendant requested additional time to prepare himself for
trial; jury trial was rescheduled to November 3, 2004 (R143-142; 271:63-71);
October 28 - Defendant, pro se, moved to continue the trial setting to allow him time
to review the report of State's expert witness, to learn "the rules and procedures" required
to cross-examine that witness, and to call his own expert witness (Rl 51-149);
November 1 - the court denies defendant's motion to continue the trial (R153);
November 3 -jury trial (R158-156; 269:1-289).
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Addendum C

1

APPEARANCES

2

For the Plaintiff:

GARY K. SEARLE

3

For the Defendant:

PRO SE
-k

A

•*• "k

5

TOOELE, UTAH - JANUARY 24, 2005

6

JUDGE RANDALL N. SKANCHY PRESIDING

7

P R O C E E D I N G S

8
9

THE COURT:
v. John Legg.

We're here in the matter of State of Utah

It's Cases 0413000055 and 041300016.

10

Mr. Legg, we were here last time for sentencing, you

11

hadn't had an opportunity to review the pre-sentence report so

12

we postponed it so that you might have an opportunity to do

13

that.

14

represent himself, did so at the time of trial and is now

15

representing himself here at the time of sentencing.

16

had an opportunity Mr. Legg now to review the pre-sentence

17

report?

I should note for the record that Mr. Legg has chosen to

18

MR. LEGG:

19

THE COURT:

Have you

Yes, I have.
Is there anything in the pre-sentence

20

report that is factually incorrect that needs to be addressed

21

here before I hear your arguments about sentencing?

22

MR. LEGG:

23

THE COURT:

24
25 J

Yes.
Go ahead then and tell me what that would

be.
MR. LEGG:

I have to, I prepared, wrote it down.
76
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1

Comes now I, the Defendant and attorney pro se, hereby objects

2

to the pre-sentence report prepared in this case for the

3

inaccuracies of the criminal history and the lack of mitigating

4

factors and the victim impact statement along with the

5

defendant's social background and accomplishments while on

6

parole for his first time after being released from prison and

7

that due to the fact the pre-sentence report are supplemental,

8

the defendant has been prejudiced from such inaccuracies since

9

1988 when he was sentenced to prison for his first time and

10

that due to such inaccuracies the defendant has never been

11

granted a parole until this past release in which the defendant

12

becomes subject again to an indeterminate sentence that's

13

devised here in the state of Utah and which is becoming a

14

widely known topic and a discussion whether or not such system

15

is constitutional or not and should become a close scrutiny

16

with the latest U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Blakeley v.

17

Washington for such case involves the inaccurate pre-sentence

18

report conducted by the parole and probation officers to the

19

courts and the defendants are becoming subject to a minimum

20

mandatory sentence that are being handed down and was of a

21

highly well publicized case right here in Utah in September

22

2004 with Weldon Angelos receiving a 55 year sentence on his

23

first time offense, possession of marijuana with the intent to

24

distribute.

And in this case, the defendant faces up to 15 to

25 J 20 years maximum depending on the sentences that are to run, if
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1

they are to run concurrent or consecutive and/or a decision

2

handed down by the Utah Board of Pardons for in Utah once the

3

sentence or commitment is ordered by the trial court, once

4

imposed and the information relied on becomes subject to the

5

Board of Pardons and Parole in which vest almost complete

6

discretion to them to determine the actual time served, (see

7

State v. Schroeder).

8

THE COURT:

9

time is—

10

MR. LEGG:

11

THE COURT:

12

I'm getting there.
—if there's some inaccuracies in the pre-

sentence report and those are what we need to focus on.

13

MR. LEGG:

14

THE COURT:

15

Mr. Legg, what I need you to do at this

I'm working up to that.
Well, I don't want you to work up to it.

I want you to go to it now because I don't have time to—

16

MR. LEGG:

17

THE COURT:

I've already told you that I don'tJust a minute, Mr. Legg.

I don't have

18

time for your discourse about federal minimum mandatory

19

sentencing which is not applicable here.

20
21
22
23

MR. LEGG:
about.

This is 15 to 20 years that we're talking

I don't have an attorney.
THE COURT:

And that's your own choice.

We went

through this process.

24

MR. LEGG:

25 I

THE COURT:

You cannot allow me five to ten minutes?
I'll allow you as much time as you want
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1

in the context of what we do for sentencing and at sentencing,

2

I ask you, is there anything in this report that's inaccurate.

3

If so, please tell me what that is.

4

MR. LEGG:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. LEGG:

7

THE COURT:

9

MR. LEGG:

10

12

Okay, well thenThe victim impact statement that I've

already spoke on.

8

11

It's my criminal background history.

THE COURT:

Then address that please.
Oh, shit.
I mean, I only have a certain amount of

time.
MR. LEGG:

And that the Utah Department of

13

Corrections shall employ the necessary staff for providing

14

investigations for conducting and preparing a pre-sentence

15

report to assist the courts and the Utah Board of Pardons in

16

its decision making responsibilities as described within Utah

17

Code Annotated 64-13-20 and the Utah Code-

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. LEGG:

20

THE COURT:

21

document you want to address?

22

MR. LEGG:

23

THE COURT: Well, then please address those.

24

MR. LEGG:

25

Are there, Mr. Legg, any inaccuraciesThere's no victim impact statements.
Are there any inaccuracies in this

Yes.

I'm telling you, there's no victim impact

statement which is mandatory language under 64-13-20 and
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1

76-3-404.

The social background is incorrect.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. LEGG:

4

THE COURT:

Tell me how it'sThe history incorrect.
Don't speak generally, speak

5

specifically.

What is, in terms of the criminal background,

6

your record, incorrect?

7

MR. LEGG:

8

THE WITNESS:

9

MR. LEGG:

11

a crime.

12

incarcerated.

I want you to walk me through it so

I was out for two years.

Which one is that on this adult record?

x

88 and I see that there are two.
MR. LEGG:

That would have been in front of Judge

16

Young that used to work here at this courtroom.

17

relieved of his duties.

18

I pled guilty to

I spent five years

I did the whole term.

THE COURT:
You say

In 1988 I was convicted.

It was a zero to five.

13

15

It says-

that I may make corrections.

10

14

I have my rap sheet.

THE COURT:

I don't see that.

He was

When I'm looking at

19

your adult record it shows January 17 of 1988 that you were

20

charged with being a fugitive from justice but that was

21

dismissed and then in September of x88 in West Valley City you

22

were there on a bench warrant probation violation for a theft

23

which you ended up serving a year at the Utah State Prison.

24 I that the one you're referring to?

Is

You were also on a warrant

for burglary theft which was zero to five years a the Utah
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State Prison.
2

MR. LEGG:

3

If you'd like to show this to the Judge right here,

4

1988.

I have it all right here, Your Honor.

Right there, was sentenced to prison.

5

That's my last pre-sentence report.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. LEGG:

8

Okay.
Which is more accurate than this one that

was prepared for this case.

9

THE COURT:

And those again, I'm looking at this pre-

10

sentence report and this one and they reflect the same thing.

11

What you've shown me is on September 1st of 1988 you went back

12

to prison because of violations of your probation.

13

tell me what is inaccurate about your record so that we can

14

resolve any differences, if there are any.

15

MR. LEGG:

you read that, I'll be able to—

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. LEGG:

We're not here to discuss the law.
No, that's not the law.

That's my pre-

sentence report.

20
21

Now,

Read that front page right there and once

16

19

Okay.

THE COURT:

I've got your pre-sentence report right

here.

22

MR. LEGG:

23

times.

24

last 17 years.

25

times, okay?

I says that I've been arrested for 40

I've only been on the streets for the five years of the
There is no possible way that I was arrested 40
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1
2

THE COURT:
I'11-

3
4

MR. LEGG:
larceny, okay?

5
6

That's something I can deal with and

I wasn't even alive in 1954 to commit

And that's part of the—

THE COURT:

Again Mr. Legg, I'm looking at a pre-

sentence report that has your adult record starting in 1987.

7

MR. LEGG:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LEGG:

Right.

In 1987-

So why do I have to hear about 1957?
1988 if you would have just took a time

10

out and reviewed the documentation that I have here, in 198 8,

11

since the pre-sentence report are supplemental as I was

12

stating, right?

13

-

- THE COURT:- Uh-huh (affirmative).

14

MR. LEGG:

In 1988 they used my dad's - I am a junior

15

- they used by dad's criminal background to sentence me and

16

since I didn't object in 1988 to the pre-sentence report, such

17

has been supplemental to that and I'm still being punished for

18

it today.

19

arrests.

20

You follow what I'm saying?

There is impossible 40

There's—
THE COURT:

I follow what you're saying, Mr. Legg,

21

but this of course doesn't reflect a supplemental pre-sentence

22

report.

23

MR. LEGG:

24

THE COURT:

If youThis is a pre-sentence report prepared

25 I b y 82
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1

MR. LEGG:

2

THE COURT:

It's inaccurate.
-the state of Utah and I'm asking you to

3

simply tell me what the inaccuracies are.

4

here.

5
6

MR. LEGG:

My criminal background, the victim impact.

It does not contain a victim impact.

7

THE COURT:

8

I've heard that.

9

history?

LO
LI

That's what we do

I've got the victim impact argument.

Now, what's inaccurate with your criminal

MR. LEGG:

There are charges that are in there that

will -

12

THE COURT:

L3

MR. LEGG:

Which charges thenI haven't been able to obtain them records

L4

yet because I'm being refused through the Department of

L5

Corrections to give me access to the records that pertain to me

16

Title 63 - what, 3-202 or something like that.

17

remember the exact title on that.

18

THE COURT:

19

1987 in West Valley.

20

and served five years at the Utah State Prison.

21

accurate one?

22

MR. LEGG:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Let's go through these.

I can't

They start in

You were convicted of a business burglary
Is that an

That's inaccurate.
So you weren't charged in West Valley

City Police Department?
MR. LEGG:

No I was not, it was in Salt Lake County.
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THE COURT:
MR. LEGG:
THE COURT:

So that's the inaccuracy?
That's one of them.
So I will make that change.

Instead of

West Valley, I'll put Salt Lake Police Department but you did
serve based upon a charge of business burglary, five years at
the Utah State Prison, that was your sentence?
MR. LEGG:
THE COURT:
MR. LEGG:

And I served the whole five years.
Good.
That's the point I'm trying to get to.

The information that is being supplied to the Board of Pardons
since you do not hand down the actual time served, okay, and
you commit me to the Board of Pardons, the inaccuracies, if
they're not corrected will allow me to be sentenced to 20
years.

If you run the sentences concurrent, it'll be 15 years.

I will be given a maximum sentence, do you understand, because
of these inaccuracies.

They have painted me and portrayed me

as a violent criminal and I do not have any violence on my
record.
THE COURT:
MR. LEGG:
THE COURT:

I don't know about that except toMisdemeanor assault.
—say that your presentation today only

underscores the fact that you are —
MR. LEGG:

You won't let me even conduct myself as an

attorney.
THE COURT:

Well, you're not an attorney and I've
84
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1

already advised you that you'd be foolish to represent yourself

2

but you've gone ahead and chosen to do that anyway.

3
4

MR. LEGG:

and we r ll get all this straightened out?

5
6

Okay, then why don't you appoint counsel

THE COURT:
route.

7

MR. LEGG:

8

THE COURT:

9

Because you've chosen to go the other

Make up you mind.
Make up my mind?

Okay.

I sentence you

on these charges to theft by receiving stolen property, a

10

second degree felony, 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison.

11

On Arson, zero to five years at the Utah State Prison.

12

run them consecutive to each other.

13

aggravating circumstances that your adult record is~ legend and

14

as a result of it being legend—

15
16

MR. LEGG:

19
20

There ain't even a victim.

THE COURT:
over.

probation and have it...

22

THE COURT:

25

We're now done because sentencing is

What do we need to do with the other case, revoke his

MR. LEGG:

24

Where's your

Please take him to the Utah State Prison.

21

23

I'll do so based upon the

victim.

17
18

I'll

You don't need to bend my thumb.
This by the way is Mr. Legg's.

If we can

give than to him so that he can have it.
MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, if you'll call this case,
we'll dismiss it.

(inaudible).
85
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THE COURT: It's called and dismissed.
MR. CUNDICK:

State v. Legg, the one ending in 055,

If you call that the State would move to dismiss.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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